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Public debt
sustainability
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Although in Latin America public debt-to-GDP ratios continue to
be generally lower than in other emerging countries, it has nevertheless
not been possible to avoid liquidity problems, which some authors
attribute to the low level and high volatility of public revenue, the
weakness of domestic financial systems, and the mediocre quality of fis-
cal institutions. This article also emphasizes some exogenous factors,
however. The combination of low economic growth rates and
devaluations in a context of dollarized liabilities has given rise to a huge
“snowball effect”, which is what has come to be called “original sin”: the
impossibility for an emerging country of borrowing abroad in its own
currency. Although the effort to control the dynamics of the public debt
will continue to be mainly at the internal level, the medium-term
sustainability of that debt will depend on actions by international financial
institutions aimed at improving the public debt conditions of emerging
countries.
Ricardo Martner






Latin American and Caribbean Institute
of Economic and Social Planning (ILPES),
ECLAC
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 4  •   D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 4




In 1998-2002, which has been called the “lost half-
decade”, the public debt grew considerably in a number
of Latin American countries. On average, coinciding
with the reversal of the macroeconomic cycle, central
government public debt rose from 35.6% to 51.9% of
GDP (excluding Nicaragua). This situation illustrates the
ongoing vulnerability of public finances in Latin
America: when capital flows fall drastically, public-
sector borrowing requirements increase, both because
the level of activity drops and because the local-
currency cost of the public sector’s external debt rises
in countries with flexible exchange-rate regimes.
In addition to the cessation of payments by Ar-
gentina and the restructuring of the external public debt
in Uruguay, there have been serious liquidity problems
in many other Latin American countries, to such a
point that there were no sovereign bond issues during
much of 2002. Could this situation have been foreseen?
Probably yes, because public finances have become
very vulnerable to short-term conditions due to the
combination of heavy short-term external borrowing
and fixed or over-valued exchange rates. There is no
doubt that an appraisal of debt sustainability cannot be
separated from a country’s capacity to generate foreign
exchange and the solidity of prevailing exchange rate
regimes.
Although many countries made significant efforts
to reduce their indebtedness in the early 1990s, the
simultaneous existence of high interest rates,1 higher
exchange rates (in cases where the public debt has a
significant external component) and episodes of
recession has had devastating consequences for public
finances. In a number of countries, the fiscal budget has
been caught up in an explosive spiral of increasing
indebtedness —a “snowball effect” in which the debt
generally absorbs a growing proportion of fiscal revenue.
The combination of scanty economic growth and
sharp depreciations of the local currency, in a context
of dollarized liabilities, has played a preponderant role
in recent crises. Much of this “snowball effect” comes
from “original sin”,2 which may be defined as the
impossibility for an emerging country of borrowing
abroad in its own currency or obtaining long-term loans
in general, even on the domestic market. Incomplete
financial markets are characterized by structural
fragilities due to currency mismatches (when projects
which generate resources in local currency are financed
in foreign exchange) and maturity mismatches (when
long-term projects are financed with short-term loans).
Original sin thus explains the “fear of floating”
attitude characteristic of the authorities in the 1990s
(Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). Exchange rate fluctuations
have always been unavoidable, however, and generate
strong wealth effects when there is a currency
mismatch between assets and liabilities, which
increases the risk of default by the public sector and
severely limits the efficacy of monetary policy (Cés-
pedes, Chang and Velasco, 2002).
Although, generally speaking public debt-to-GDP
ratios —the usual indicators of the public sector’s long-
term solvency— have continued to be comparatively
lower in Latin America,3 the region has not managed
to avoid the short-term liquidity problems which do so
much harm to countries’ credibility. In recent studies,
this contrast is explained by the low level and high
volatility of public revenue, the weakness of domestic
financial systems, and the mediocre quality of fiscal
institutions.
In the light of recent events, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) has given a central place among
its concerns to the issue of the sustainability of the
public debt and has prepared various studies on this
subject.4 A controversial conclusion of some of these
and other studies is that, in order to be sustainable, the
public debt of emerging countries should not be more
than 25%-30% of GDP.5 If this limit were applied, most
of the Latin American countries would fall into the
dubious category of “unsustainable”, which would
1
 Attributable largely to the turbulence of credit markets and the
procyclical bias of country risk evaluation agencies.
2
 This expression was first used by Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999).
3
 On average, according to estimates by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF, 2003c), the public debt amounts to almost 70% of GDP
in the emerging economies of Asia, 90% in those of Africa and the
Middle East, and 55% in the transitional economies.
4
 See, for example, IMF (2003c).
5
 Various recent articles have come to similar conclusions: see, for
example, Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) and Goldstein
(2003).
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mean that they would have to generate substantial
primary surpluses in the coming years in order to
absorb the public debt overhang.
The country studies are a good deal more
cautious, since they place their emphasis on structural
questions when appraising the sustainability of the
public debt.6 As Ter-Minassian (2004) points out,
sustainability is a probabilistic matter by its very
nature, since the dynamics of the public debt depend
on uncertain physical and macroeconomic events.
Models can indicate the probable upper limits of the
debt, but they cannot indicate what level of
indebtedness is too high. This approach, which is much
more flexible, avoids general conclusions on the
optimum level of the public debt.
This article describes the main trends and
accounting problems that prevent us from having a
suitable comparative base for the analysis of the public
debt (section II). It then analyses the various
components of public debt dynamics, with special
emphasis on the snowball effect and the procyclical
bias of fiscal policy (section III). It then goes on to look
at the factors which explain public debt crises, first of
all quantifying the impact of currency mismatches on
fiscal sustainability and then estimating an early war-
ning model which makes it possible to calculate the
likelihood of a debt crisis on the basis of fiscal and
macroeconomic environment variables such as growth,
the degree of economic openness and capital flows
(section IV). Finally, it reviews the various proposals
that have been put forward for improving the financing
conditions of the public debt, with the aim of ensuring
its long-term sustainability in middle-income Latin
American countries.
II
Main trends and accounting aspects
When we look at the trajectory of the average level of
public indebtedness in Latin America and the
Caribbean since 1990, we obtain a U-shaped curve
(figure 1). The debt declines up to 1997 and then starts
to rise again, but its 2003 level is lower than that of
1990, in the case of the non-financial public-sector
debt. It is also observed that the levels of indebtedness
of the central government and the non-financial public
sector tend to converge, which reflects the limited
borrowing capacity that subnational levels of
government and public enterprises have had in the last
few years.7
Tables 1 and 2 show the coefficients of public
indebtedness, as a proportion of GDP, of the central
government and the non-financial public sector. For the
central government, the public debt-to-GDP ratio went
down between 1990 and 2003 in 11 of the 19 countries
6
 See for example IMF (2003a).
7
 This evolution reflects the impact of the programmes supported
by the IMF, which generally fix targets for the surplus and public
debt that have a broad scope and include public enterprises. For an
analysis of this question, see Martner (2003).
FIGURE 1
Latin America and the Caribbean:
Public debt stock, by institutional
coverage, 1990-2003
(As percentages of GDP)







1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Central governmnet Non-financial public sector
of the region covered by the tables; in some of those
countries (Chile, Ecuador, Mexico and the Dominican
Republic up to 2002) the reduction was very
significant. In seven countries, in contrast, this
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TABLE 1
Latin America and the Caribbean: Central government public
debt stock, 1990-2003
(As percentages of GDP)a
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Argentina 29.4 31.3 33.8 35.7 34.5 37.6 43.0 45.0 53.7 145.9 138.1
   Domestic 8.9 9.8 13.1 15.2 20.9 54.2 59.9
   External 25.6 27.8 29.9 29.8 32.9 91.6 78.2
Bolivia 65.1 52.9 51.5 63.5 64.3 61.8 54.9 57.9 57.4 61.1 62.6 71.7 74.9 82.2
   Domestic 14.4 14.1 13.8 13.9 13.5 13.7 16.7 19.4 26.4 28.1 26.7
   External 65.1 52.9 51.5 49.1 50.2 48.0 41.0 44.4 43.7 44.4 43.1 45.3 46.9 55.5
Brazil 12.8 12.1 9.5 12.9 13.3 15.9 18.7 25.0 30.1 31.0 32.8 35.6 36.9
   Domestic -2.2 0.8 1.8 6.5 9.8 14.3 16.7 20.8 22.2 23.5 24.5 23.1 26.7
   External 14.9 11.3 7.7 6.4 3.5 1.6 2.0 4.2 7.9 7.5 8.2 12.5 10.2
Chile 45.4 38.8 31.7 29.2 23.5 17.9 15.1 13.2 12.5 13.8 13.7 15.0 15.7 13.3
   Domestic 26.4 22.0 18.2 17.5 14.2 12.1 10.9 10.0 9.3 9.8 10.0 10.5 10.0 7.7
   External 19.1 16.8 13.5 11.7 9.4 5.7 4.2 3.2 3.2 4.0 3.6 4.5 5.7 5.7
Colombia 14.8 14.0 15.0 14.5 12.7 13.9 14.4 17.8 22.1 29.5 36.9 44.3 50.7 51.9
   Domestic 1.9 1.5 2.9 4.5 4.6 5.8 6.6 8.8 10.6 14.4 18.7 22.1 25.2 26.2
   External 12.9 12.5 12.1 10.1 8.1 8.1 7.8 8.9 11.5 15.1 18.3 22.2 25.6 25.7
Costa Rica 28.5 23.3 24.3 26.8 28.7 33.2 30.0 39.5 35.2 36.6 38.6 40.8 40.0
   Domestic 9.9 9.0 11.5 15.0 17.1 24.0 22.2 31.4 26.6 26.4 27.7 28.6 26.9
   External 18.6 14.2 12.8 11.8 11.5 9.2 7.8 8.1 8.6 10.1 10.9 12.2 13.1
Ecuador 67.1 64.5 72.2 85.1 71.1 59.1 58.7 51.7 56.3 83.6 71.8 58.0 51.1 47.9
   Domestic 1.9 2.1 1.5 2.7 7.7 7.3 8.8 7.0 10.5 18.1 17.8 13.3 11.4 11.1
   External 65.2 62.5 70.7 82.3 63.4 51.8 49.9 44.7 45.9 65.5 54.0 44.7 39.7 36.8
El Salvador 45.7 41.7 43.1 44.3 41.7 37.3 37.8 36.2 33.3 26.0 27.4 31.1 36.0 38.0
   Domestic 16.0 16.3 14.5 13.4 12.0 11.2 7.9 9.8 12.0 11.7 11.5
   External 45.7 41.7 43.1 28.4 25.4 22.8 24.4 24.2 22.0 18.1 17.6 19.2 24.3 26.5
Guatemala 23.1 17.5 16.5 15.5 15.4 14.0 13.5 14.0 14.6 17.5 16.9 18.0 16.4 18.5
   Domestic 10.2 7.8 7.2 6.9 6.5 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.0 5.8 5.8 5.6 4.5 5.6
   External 12.9 9.7 9.3 8.5 8.9 8.7 8.2 8.5 9.6 11.8 11.2 12.4 11.9 12.9
Haiti 37.9 40.0 36.6 38.6 43.8 46.2 60.3 58.3
   Domestic 12.6 12.0 11.1 12.1 13.6 14.8 17.5 17.4
   External 25.3 28.0 25.5 26.5 30.2 31.5 42.8 40.9
Hondurasb 109.9 82.3 81.5 96.4 105.7 95.0 90.3 80.9 75.0 78.8 70.2 70.7 73.0 71.9
   Domestic 3.7 4.0 3.8
   External 109.9 82.3 81.5 96.4 105.7 95.0 90.3 80.9 75.0 78.8 70.2 67.0 69.0 68.1
Mexico 46.5 38.1 28.1 25.3 35.3 40.8 31.1 25.8 27.8 25.6 23.2 22.5 24.0 24.7
   Domestic 22.4 16.8 11.9 10.7 12.6 8.5 7.6 8.6 9.1 11.1 12.1 13.5 13.8 14.8
   External 24.0 21.3 16.3 14.6 22.7 32.4 23.5 17.2 16.6 14.6 10.8 9.6 9.1 9.6
Nicaragua 304.5 252.4 141.1 206.9 197.0 183.8 175.9 179.0 194.4 193.8
   Domestic 14.9 10.8 15.0 85.5 72.9 67.4 63.3 66.8 81.7 79.5
   External 289.6 241.6 126.0 121.5 124.1 116.4 112.6 112.2 112.7 114.3
Panama 67.7 60.8 56.0 62.3 61.7 58.9 79.9 75.7 74.5 80.5 76.0 82.2
   Domestic 20.9 18.5 16.4 26.4 25.3 22.7 24.1 21.9 20.5 23.9 20.9 20.7
   External 46.8 42.3 39.6 35.9 36.4 36.3 55.7 53.8 54.0 56.6 55.1 61.4 56.2 56.2
Paraguay 13.1 12.0 8.9 10.1 7.3 10.1 10.0 11.1 13.4 22.3 26.2 33.3 46.4 37.7
   External 13.1 12.0 8.9 10.1 7.3 10.1 10.0 11.1 13.4 22.3 26.2 33.3 46.4 37.7
Peru 52.4 60.9 59.6 63.6 53.4 47.8 45.1 31.8 40.3 47.1 45.3 45.1 47.3 48.4
   Domestic 5.9 9.3 9.4 9.5 10.3 10.3
   External 52.4 60.9 59.6 63.6 53.4 47.8 45.1 31.8 34.4 37.8 35.9 35.6 36.9 38.0
Dominican
Republicb 84.7 60.6 49.2 47.8 37.5 33.2 29.2 23.9 23.1 20.9 19.0 19.6 24.0 40.2
Uruguay 26.8 24.1 23.3 22.3 22.0 22.6 24.0 26.2 31.9 41.9 98.7 97.9
Venezuela
(Bolivarian Republic of)b 45.2 30.9 28.4 28.2 26.2 29.9 41.0 42.9
   Domestic 3.9 3.1 3.2 4.6 7.7 11.1 12.5 14.8
   External 41.3 27.9 25.2 23.6 18.5 18.8 28.5 28.1
Latin Americac 53.0 41.8 38.4 40.3 39.0 36.7 37.2 34.3 35.6 39.3 39.1 41.9 51.9 52.3
   Domestic 13.9 9.6 8.5 11.3 12.3 11.7 12.1 11.6 12.3 14.0 15.0 15.7 18.2 18.8
   External 46.0 36.3 34.3 34.2 31.9 29.6 29.2 26.1 26.1 28.6 27.1 28.1 34.3 34.3
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official information.
a GDP data at current prices and in local currency were used to calculate the indicators in this table. The exchange rate at the end of each
period was used.
b Corresponds to the public sector.
c Simple average, not including the public debt of Nicaragua.
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TABLE 2
Latin America and the Caribbean: Public debt stock
of the non-financial public sector, 1990-2003
(As percentages of GDP)a
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Argentina 27.6 30.0 31.8 34.4 36.4 35.4 38.2 43.5 45.6 53.7 162.5 138.1
Bolivia 88.9 75.8 75.0 87.7 90.2 87.1 78.0 71.2 69.8 73.5 74.3 82.0 85.6 92.4
   Domestic 14.4 14.1 13.8 13.9 13.5 13.7 16.7 19.4 26.4 28.1 26.7
   External 88.9 75.8 75.0 73.2 76.1 73.3 64.1 57.7 56.1 56.8 54.9 55.6 57.6 65.7
Brazil 38.1 37.1 32.5 30.0 30.6 33.3 34.4 41.7 49.2 49.4 52.6 55.9 58.2
   Domestic 14.0 18.4 18.3 21.3 25.0 29.4 30.1 35.5 38.8 39.7 42.2 41.5 46.3
   External 24.2 18.7 14.2 8.7 5.6 3.9 4.3 6.2 10.4 9.8 10.4 14.4 11.9
Chile 55.2 44.8 36.5 32.9 26.6 20.9 18.4 16.8 17.7 19.1 18.6 20.3 22.2 20.1
Colombia 22.9 26.8 29.3 38.7 44.3 48.7 57.1 55.3
   Domestic 10.0 12.3 12.3 17.1 20.8 21.5 26.4 25.8
   External 12.8 14.5 17.0 21.7 23.5 27.2 30.7 29.6
Costa Ricab 28.5 23.3 24.3 26.8 28.7 33.2 30.0 39.5 35.2 36.6 38.6 40.8 40.0
   Domestic 9.9 9.0 11.5 15.0 17.1 24.0 22.2 31.4 26.6 26.4 27.7 28.6 26.9
   External 18.6 14.2 12.8 11.8 11.5 9.2 7.8 8.1 8.6 10.1 10.9 12.2 13.1
Ecuador 74.2 81.2 85.1 77.6 64.7 64.4 56.6 61.9 92.0 79.7 63.4 55.6 51.8
   Domestic 2.1 1.5 2.7 7.7 7.3 8.8 7.0 10.5 18.1 17.8 13.3 11.4 11.1
   External 72.1 79.7 82.3 69.9 57.4 55.6 49.6 51.4 73.9 62.0 50.1 44.2 40.7
El Salvador 29.0 30.1 34.0 39.1 41.3
   Domestic 7.9 9.8 12.0 11.7 11.5
   External 21.1 20.4 22.0 27.4 29.8
Guatemala 33.2 24.8 22.3 20.4 19.4 17.5 16.3 16.5 17.3 20.2 18.9 19.4 17.5 19.5
   Domestic 10.2 7.8 7.2 6.9 6.5 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.0 5.8 5.8 5.6 4.5 5.6
   External 23.0 17.0 15.1 13.5 12.9 12.3 10.9 11.0 12.2 14.5 13.1 13.8 13.0 13.9
Haiti 43.3 45.3 41.1 42.7 49.1 50.7 66.6 64.4
   Domestic 12.5 11.7 11.0 12.0 13.5 14.7 17.4 17.5
   External 30.8 33.6 30.1 30.7 35.6 36.0 49.2 46.9
Honduras 109.9 82.3 81.5 96.4 105.7 95.0 90.3 80.9 75.0 78.8 70.2 70.7 73.0 71.9
   Domestic 3.7 4.0 3.8
   External 109.9 82.3 81.5 96.4 105.7 95.0 90.3 80.9 75.0 78.8 70.2 67.0 69.0 68.1
Mexico 45.1 32.4 21.8 18.8 31.2 35.8 25.8 20.7 22.6 21.0 18.1 18.1 21.4 21.9
   Domestic 17.8 13.8 7.1 7.0 4.2 -0.7 2.9 6.3 8.0 10.5 9.3 12.0 16.5 18.1
   External 27.3 18.6 14.7 11.9 27.0 36.5 22.9 14.4 14.6 10.5 8.7 6.1 5.0 3.9
Nicaragua 422.3 349.6 209.6 217.3 212.7 204.7 201.7 205.3 213.8 213.0
   Domestic 6.7 9.9 15.5 29.6 26.5 22.2 28.2 41.9 50.3 48.7
   External 415.7 339.7 194.2 187.6 186.2 182.5 173.5 163.4 163.5 124.1
Panama 123.4 114.2 89.9 97.8 94.5 95.8 84.0 78.2 75.8 79.8 77.2 83.3 76.0 74.8
   Domestic 17.8 14.8 15.1 25.1 23.3 21.2 21.8 19.8 18.6 22.1 21.2 21.2 19.4 14.2
   External 105.6 99.5 74.8 72.7 71.2 74.5 62.2 58.3 57.2 57.8 55.9 62.1 56.6 56.2
Paraguay 32.4 27.3 21.0 19.1 16.0 15.7 14.9 16.3 19.3 29.0 29.3 36.6 50.7 40.6
Perub 52.4 60.9 59.6 63.6 53.4 47.8 45.1 31.8 40.3 47.1 45.3 45.1 47.3 48.4
   Domestic 5.9 9.3 9.4 9.5 10.3 10.3
   External 52.4 60.9 59.6 63.6 53.4 47.8 45.1 31.8 34.4 37.8 35.9 35.6 36.9 38.0
Dominican
Republic 84.7 60.6 49.2 47.8 37.5 33.2 29.2 23.9 23.1 20.9 19.0 19.6 24.0 40.2
Uruguay 34.4 30.3 30.9 29.0 27.9 27.8 28.6 30.9 35.9 46.7 106.0 104.1
   Domestic 4.1 3.5 3.9 3.3 3.0 4.1 4.6 7.7 8.6 15.6 25.4 22.5
   External 30.3 26.7 27.0 25.7 24.9 23.7 24.0 23.2 27.3 31.1 80.6 81.6
Venezuela
(Bolivarian Republic of) 45.2 30.9 28.4 28.2 26.2 29.9 41.0 42.9
   Domestic 3.9 3.1 3.2 4.6 7.7 11.1 12.5 14.8
   External 41.3 27.9 25.2 23.6 18.5 18.8 28.5 28.1
Latin Americac 69.5 55.3 47.2 49.0 48.0 45.4 41.7 37.8 39.4 43.3 42.7 45.2 57.9 57.0
   Domestic 11.9 10.4 8.9 11.2 12.0 11.5 12.3 12.3 13.3 15.2 16.1 16.9 18.4 18.2
   External 67.8 52.1 46.4 46.7 46.4 44.0 36.5 32.0 31.7 33.5 31.9 31.9 37.5 37.7
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official information.
a GDP data at current prices and in local currency were used to calculate the indicators in this table. The exchange rate at the end of each
period was used.
b Corresponds to the central government.
c Simple average, not including the public debt of Nicaragua.
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coefficient increased sharply, while in Bolivia it
remained more or less unchanged.
The trend of the public debt-to-GDP ratio in 2001-
2002 in Argentina and Uruguay warrants special
mention. In both cases, the sharp rise in the ratio
following the devaluations of these countries’
currencies clearly illustrates the “original sin”
hypothesis. In Argentina, the convertibility regime
undoubtedly artificially reduced the size of the public
debt relative to GDP. This indicator increased almost
threefold as from 2002, after the devaluation and the
deepening of the recession, although it could also be
argued that the medium-term equilibrium exchange rate
should be lower than the level registered during 2002.
The reverse situation was observed in Ecuador, because
the persistence of inflation in a dollarized regime
pushed up the real exchange rate, thus reducing the
burden of the public debt on the economy in relative
terms.
In the case of the non-financial public sector (table
2), few differences are observed compared with the
central government, except in the case of Brazil. There,
the net public debt in 2003 was 36.9% of GDP at the
central government level and 58.2% at the level of the
non-financial public sector. This difference is due
largely to borrowing by subnational levels of
government.
There is a great deal of heterogeneity as regards
public debt data. The Government Finance Statistics
Manual published by the IMF defines the public debt
in the following terms: “Debt consists of all liabilities
that require payment or payments of interest and/or
principal by the debtor to the creditor at a date or da-
tes in the future. Thus, all liabilities in the GFS system
are debt except for shares and other equity and
financial derivatives” (IMF, 2001, p. 129). It should be
noted that the Manual recommends treating future
liabilities of the social security system and contingent
liabilities as memorandum items rather than as public
debt.
In addition to the importance of contingent
liabilities in some cases, the following classification
problems may also be noted:
i) Consolidation of data within the same sphere of
government. The Manual does not make any
reference to the treatment of central government
debt with institutions belonging to other spheres
of government of the same State (for example,
social security funds or housing cooperatives
which are holders of treasury bonds), so that some
countries present both consolidated data
(sometimes as net indebtedness) and
unconsolidated data. Which is the appropriate
information? Some consider that what is
important is the recording of the debt, regardless
of the nature of its holder, since the obligation to
pay exists in all cases. Others, however, consider
that consolidation (for example, between social
security funds and the central government) reflects
a recognition of the fact that financial flows within
the public sector do not have the same
macroeconomic effects as borrowing by that sec-
tor from the private sector. At all events, doubt
remains about the best methodology to use at the
central government level, which is what most of
the data refer to. The problem disappears, of
course, if the coverage is expanded to embrace
general government or the non-financial public
sector.
ii) Integration of central bank debt. In some cases,
liabilities are included, but not assets
(international reserves), leading to inflation of the
debt in countries with a significant monetary base.
iii) Differentiation between direct and indirect public
debt. Should not the granting of loan guarantees
and other types of backing be considered as a
contingent liability rather than a certain public
debt?
iv) Domestic public debt. Three countries of the
region (Honduras, Paraguay and the Dominican
Republic) do not publish official data on their
domestic public debt.
As regards the composition of the debt, the data
show a clear tendency to make more intensive use of
domestic debt instruments, which should reduce
countries’ exposure to exchange rate fluctuations, at
least in the case of instruments which are not indexed
to the dollar. Among the countries which have followed
this trend are Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica and
Mexico.
In the IMF and World Bank guidelines on public
debt management (World Bank/IMF, 2001), it is stated
that the “main objective” of such management is “to
ensure that the government’s financing needs and its
payment obligations are met at the lowest possible cost
over the medium- to long-run, consistent with a prudent
degree of risk”. In this respect, the use of a theoretical
framework of asset and liability management for
administering the public debt is a useful method (box
1), since the cost and risk analysis of the portfolio of
public-sector debt instruments is directly linked with
fiscal income. In this analysis, the characteristics and
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Box 1
PUBLIC DEBT MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES
Debt management strategies that involve excessive reliance on foreign-currency or short-term loans (including
those with variable interest rates) are very risky. For example, while foreign-currency debt may appear, ex
ante, to be less expensive than local-currency debt with the same maturity (since the latter may involve higher
liquidity risk and liquidity premiums), it could prove to be costly in volatile capital markets or if the currency
depreciates. Furthermore, the choice of exchange-rate regime can affect the links between debt management
and monetary policy. Foreign-currency debt may appear to be cheaper under a fixed-exchange-rate regime
because the regime limits exchange-rate volatility. However, such debt can prove to be very risky if the
exchange-rate regime becomes untenable.
A framework should be developed to enable government debt managers to identify and manage the trade-
offs between cost and risk in the debt portfolio. Debt managers usually handle various types of risks; an
important role of the debt manager is to identify these risks, assess (to the extent possible) their magnitude,
and develop a preferred strategy for managing the trade-off between expected cost and risk. This means that
debt managers should have access to a range of financial and macroeconomic projections. In order to assess
the risks, they should regularly conduct stress tests of the debt portfolio on the basis of the economic and
financial shocks to which the government —and, in more general terms, the country— are potentially exposed,
including the risk that the government will not be able to roll over its debt and be forced to default, since this
situation has costs that affect more than just the government’s budget. Moreover, debt managers should consider
the interactions between the financial situation of the public sector and that of the financial and non-financial
sectors in times of stress in order to ensure that the government’s debt management activities do not exacerbate
risks in the private sector. In general, the models used should make it possible to undertake the following
types of risk analysis:
• Project debt-servicing costs over the medium/long term on the basis of assumptions regarding factors that
affect debt-servicing capacity, such as new financing requirements, the maturity profile of the debt stock,
the interest rates and currencies of new debt, projected future interest rates and exchange rates and the
behaviour of relevant non-financial variables (such as commodity prices).
• Generate a debt profile consisting of key risk indicators for the existing and projected debt portfolios over
the projected horizon. These indicators should include the ratio of short-term to long-term debt and of
foreign exchange to local-currency debt, the currency composition of the foreign-exchange debt, average
debt maturity and the profile of maturing debts.
• Calculate the expected cost of debt in terms that are relevant to the government’s objectives (for example,
in relation to the effects of the debt on the public budget).
• Calculate the real risk of future debt-servicing costs by summarizing the results of stress tests formulated
on the basis of the economic and financial shocks to which the government and the country are potentially
exposed.
• Summarize the costs and risks of alternative strategies for managing the government’s debt portfolio to
provide a basis for making informed financing decisions.
In countries with well-developed financial markets, debt managers typically follow one of two courses:
either they periodically determine what debt structure is desired and use this to guide new issues of debt
instruments for the subsequent period or they set strategic benchmarks to guide the day-to-day management
of the government’s debt portfolio. These benchmarks are generally expressed as numerical targets for key
portfolio risk indicators, such as the ratio of short-term to long-term debt or the ratio of foreign-currency to
local-currency debt. The key distinction between these two approaches is the extent to which government debt
managers operate in financial markets on a regular basis to ensure that those benchmarks are reached.
Source: World Bank/IMF (2001).
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risks of cash flows are examined and, as far as possible,
liabilities with similar characteristics are chosen in
order to minimize the possibility of liquidity constraints
due to maturity and currency mismatches.
Since the 1980s crisis, public debt management
has been a constant concern for the Latin American and
Caribbean countries. Accounting difficulties still exist,
however, in terms of definition and coverage. Risk
rating agencies show a systematic bias, since they
always use the highest figures in making their
assessments and often include some contingent
liabilities. Thus, for example, Brazil’s unconsolidated
public-sector debt represented more than 70% of GDP
in 2002, while the consolidated debt was only slightly
over 50% of GDP. Although the goal agreed upon with
IMF refers to the second of these indicators, most of the
analysts use the first one.
In the absence of a homogeneous methodology
that permits a complete accounting of assets and
liabilities, the usual practice should be to record, for
comparison purposes, the gross consolidated public
debt of the general government (i.e., without including
the central bank or public enterprises). Indebtedness in
respect of contingent liabilities, even if those




The sustainability of the public debt is equivalent to
the long-term solvency of the government. The
dynamics of the public debt may be broken down
according to the following definition:
Dt = Dt–1 – SGt + SFt [1]
where D is the public debt stock, expressed in local
currency, SG is the overall government balance, the
subscript t corresponds to the current year, and SF is
the stock/flow adjustment that ensures consistency
between net indebtedness and variation in the public
debt stock.8 The stock/flow adjustment includes a
number of variables, such as the variations in the public
debt due to exchange-rate fluctuations in the local
currency and between the currencies in which the debts
are denominated, government acknowledgement of
debts owed by the rest of the economy, and other
statistical discrepancies, which in some cases can
represent the accounting registration of “skeletons in
the cupboard”.9
The equation can be presented in such a way as
to use the primary balance10 as an indicator:
Dt = Dt–1(1+r) – SPt + SFt [2]
where SP is the primary balance and r is the implicit
real interest rate, calculated as debt interest payments
expressed as a percentage of the debt stock in the
preceding period.11 As regards GDP (Yt), the equation
may be reformulated as follows, where n corresponds
































































or, if the lower case letters represent proportions of GDP:
∆d sp d r n
n
sft t t= − + ⋅ −+ +−1 1 [5]
8
 For an example of the application of this methodology to the
European countries, see European Commission (2003).
9
 One example has been the acknowledgement of commitments in
respect of pension system benefits.
10
 The primary balance is defined as the global balance, less outlays
in respect of interest payments on the public debt.
11
 The implicit interest rate should be understood as an
approximation to the real interest rate paid by the country. Using
the spread between the interest rates on sovereign bonds issued by
countries of the region as compared with the rates on United States
treasury bonds may be misleading, because it only expresses the
interest rate paid at a given moment, whereas what is being analysed
here is a balance which includes all the debts generated in the past.
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Debt dynamics (∆d) are then separated into three
components: the primary balance (sp), the “snowball
effect” (that is to say, the effects of the interest burden
on the accumulated debt stock) and the stock/flow
adjustment (sf). We will analyse the first two of these
components in detail below.
1. The procyclical bias of fiscal policy
In the recent debate, there has been broad acceptance
of the criterion of the unhindered operation of automatic
stabilizers in normal circumstances, as a guiding
criterion in fiscal policy. This principle was adopted by
ECLAC quite some time ago, when it recommended the
use of a structural indicator of the public balance instead
of the effective balance (ECLAC, 1998). If this were so,
the public debt-to-GDP ratio would be constant
throughout the macroeconomic cycle.
It has been observed, however, that the fiscal
policy of various countries of the region displayed an
anomalous form of behaviour in the 1990s, resulting
in a rise in the public debt-to-GDP ratio even in periods
when growth was higher than the trend levels.12 One
way of analysing this bias is to compare the changes
in the cyclically adjusted public balance with the GDP
gap (figure 2). If the automatic stabilizers had operated
symmetrically, that is to say, if discretional policies had
been neutral throughout the economic cycle, then the
points should be spread along the abscissa axis. In the
case of countercyclical policies, the points should be
located in the upper-right and lower-left quadrants. If
the points are concentrated in the upper-left and lower-
right quadrants, this shows a tendency to apply
procyclical discretional policies.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, examination
of 45 episodes of variation in the global public balan-
ce adjusted for the business cycle shows that 12 of
them were neutral with respect to the cycle, in 25 ca-
ses fiscal policy exhibited a procyclical tendency, and
only 8 cases reflected a countercyclical form of
behaviour. To be more exact, in 13 of the 17 cases in
which GDP grew at a higher rate than the trend level,
the change in the cyclically adjusted public balance was
negative, which reflects an expansionary fiscal policy.
In contrast, when the economies grew at a slower rate
than the medium-term trend, the change in the
cyclically adjusted public balance was positive in 12
of the 16 episodes in question, reflecting a restrictive
fiscal policy.13 Similar conclusions are reached when
we analyse the changes in the cyclically adjusted
primary public balance (also called the non-financial
balance). These exercises illustrate the usual form of
behaviour of the fiscal authorities of Latin America and
the Caribbean, which is of course not much different
from that of other countries.
Figure 3 compares the economies’ position in the
cycle (for the same 45 episodes) with the changes in
the public debt, at the central government level.
In this case, there are 15 significant countercyclical
episodes of reductions in the public debt in the context
of a positive GDP gap, with particularly notable cases
including those of Chile (1992-1998), Ecuador (1991-
1998), Peru (1994-2000), Mexico (1990-1994 and
1998-2001) and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezue-
la (1991-1993 and 1997-1998), among others.
There were other episodes of reductions in the
public debt in the context of a negative GDP gap,
especially in the Dominican Republic (1990-1996),
Uruguay (1990-1991) and Paraguay (1990-1991). In a
number of episodes there was an increase in the public
FIGURE 2
Latin America and the Caribbean:
Procyclical policy episodes, 1990-2001
(Changes in the cyclically adjusted global
balance and the GDP gap)
12
 A study on the evolution of the cyclical and structural components
of the public debt in terms of the GDP gap between 1970 and 1997
in the member countries of the European Union reveals the existence
of a procyclical bias in fiscal policy (European Commission, 2001).
Source: Martner and Tromben (2003). Only episodes in which the
absolute values of the annual average GDP gap and the annual ave-
rage change in the cyclically adjusted balance were over 0.25% for
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 In this case, countries generally have no option but to adjust, so
that it is more a question of a result than of a policy.
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debt in boom periods, which has naturally resulted in
greater fiscal vulnerability during recent recessionary
situations. The case of Argentina (1996-1998) is
particularly clear in this respect, with an increase in the
debt at rates higher than the medium-term growth rate
for several years running. In recent years the same
thing has occurred, albeit on a smaller scale, in Brazil
(1995-1998), Colombia (1994-1998), Costa Rica
(1998-2001) and Paraguay (1993-1998).
The countries that gained degrees of freedom
during the 1990s by reducing their public debt burden
during periods of economic buoyancy were better
prepared to cope with the reversal of the cycle. During
1998-2002, some countries systematically registered
negative primary balances, causing a build-up of debt
—this time countercyclical— which was equally
dangerous. Figure 4 shows, for each country, as an
average for the 1998-2002 period, the effective primary
balance and the primary balance required to stabilize
the public debt, calculated as the standard short-term
sustainability indicator developed by Blanchard,
Chouraqui and others (1990). The required primary
balance is calculated as that which stabilizes the public
debt balance as a proportion of GDP.
In terms of equation [5], it is assumed that ∆d = 0,
sf = 0, thus giving the primary balance needed to
stabilize the public debt:





In this way, a significant negative difference may
be observed between the two concepts, except in the
cases of Chile, the Dominican Republic, Mexico and
Panama. The gap (to reach the isoline on the figure
which represents the meeting point) averaged more
than five points of GDP in Colombia and Uruguay, and
more than three points in Argentina and Bolivia. In this
way, we seek to quantify the primary balance needed
to stabilize the public debt, as if this were a policy
variable independent of the macroeconomic
environment. The problem with this kind of indicator
is that it does not take account of the wealth effects
which result, for example, from changes in relative
prices reflected both in the snowball effect and in the
stock/flow component.
2. The snowball effect
The objective of reducing the public debt is thus
practically unattainable in a situation of low growth and
high interest rates. In Latin America during 1990-2002,
the maximum snowball effect reached 4.5 points of
GDP, associated with a public debt stock of 55.1% of
GDP (table 3). The highest levels registered were 12.2
points of GDP in Ecuador, 8.8 points in Argentina, 8.5
points in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, and
over 5 points in Brazil, Honduras and Mexico. In
contrast, the maximum average for the same period
came to 3.8 points of GDP, with a much higher public
debt balance of 72.8% of GDP.
Figure 5 gives a quantitative expression of debt
dynamics as a proportion of GDP (∆d), separating the
contribution of the primary balance in relation to GDP
FIGURE 3
Latin America and the Caribbean: Procyclical
financial policy episodes, 1990-2001
(Changes in the central government public debt
stock and the GDP gap)
Source: Prepared by the authors. Only episodes in which the absolute
values of the annual average GDP gap and the annual average change
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TABLE 3
Latin America and the Caribbean and the European Union:
Magnitude of the snowball effect
Maximum of snowball Public debt associated Cumulative Change in
effect snowball effect  with maximum snowball effect  public debt
1990-2002 1998-2002
Latin American countries 4.5 55.1 9.4 17.5
Argentina 8.8 (2002) 145.9 24.0 108.3
Bolivia 1.3 (2001) 61.1 2.5 17.5
Brazil 5.6 (1998) 25.0 17.7 10.6
Chile 0.4 (1999) 13.8 0.5 3.2
Colombia 4.3 (1999) 29.5 17.3 28.6
Costa Rica 4.4 (1996) 33.2 10.5 1.3
Ecuador 12.2 (1999) 83.6 21.3 –5.2
El Salvador 0.9 (2002) 36.0 2.5 2.7
Guatemala 1.0 (2001) 18.0 3.5 1.8
Haiti 0.6 (2001) 46.2 –0.1 23.6
Honduras 5.9 (1994) 105.7 3.4 –2.0
Mexico 6.4 (1995) 40.8 9.9 –3.8
Panama 3.7 (2001) 83.3 5.0 0.2
Paraguay 2.3 (2002) 46.4 5.9 33.1
Peru 4.7 (1992) 59.6 6.5 7.0
Dominican Republic 0.4 (2002) 24.0 –2.0 0.9
Uruguay 10.3 (2002) 98.7 19.7 74.7
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 8.5 (2002) 41.0 20.4 12.6
European Union 3.8 72.8 3.2 –7.2
Belgium 7.2 (1993) 138.2 13.5 –13.5
Denmark 6.4 (1993) 78.0 11.6 –10.7
Germany 2.7 (1996) 59.8 9.7 –0.1
Greece 2.8 (1993) 110.1 0.3 –1.1
Spain 1.7 (1996) 68.1 –3.6 –10.8
France 3.0 (1993) 45.3 5.4 –0.5
Ireland 1.1 (1992) 100.2 –19.5 –22.5
Italy 9.9 (1993) 118.1 11.0 –9.6
Luxemburg 0.2 (2002) 5.7 –0.6 –0.6
Netherlands 4.3 (1993) 79.3 2.3 –14.4
Austria 2.5 (1993) 61.8 7.1 3.0
Portugal 5.1 (1993) 59.1 –1.6 3.1
Finland 3.9 (1993) 55.9 2.0 –5.9
Sweden 4.7 (1996) 73.5 7.5 –15.3
United Kingdom 1.7 (1992) 39.2 2.4 –9.1
Source: For the Latin American countries the figures were prepared by the authors on the basis of ECLAC data. For the European countries
the data were taken from European Commission (2003).
(-sp), the snowball effect and the stock/flow adjustment
(sf). This breakdown covers the period from 1998 to
2002, with the countries divided into three groups.
Group A consists of the countries that have issued
sovereign bonds, which therefore have access to
international capital markets, and whose public debt
increased. Group B comprises the countries which have
access to capital markets but whose public debt has
gone down or remained unchanged. Group C consists
of the countries which are not included in the J.P.
Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index.
In the first group, the main source of increase in
the public debt was the devaluation in 2002, which is
reflected, above all, in the size of the adjustment in
wealth in Argentina and Uruguay. In Brazil, the
primary surplus accumulated during the period was not
enough to offset the exogenous increase in the public
debt. In Colombia, these exogenous factors came on
top of persistent primary deficits. In Peru and the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the increase in the
public debt was slight and is attributable exclusively
to this kind of factor.
The case of Brazil is instructive. This country
began to generate systematic primary surpluses from
1999 on. The Fiscal Responsibility Act, passed on 4
May 2000, established primary surplus targets for the
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following three budget years. Even so, the effort made
in 1998-2002 to build up a primary surplus of over 10
points of GDP failed to contain the growth of the public
debt, due to low economic growth and the deterioration
in financing terms. The establishment (agreed with IMF)
of primary balance targets instead of global balance or
debt targets represented a great achievement in itself,
since it made it possible to separate the fiscal objective
from fluctuations in interest and exchange rates. As this
meant that the global deficit and the public debt were
higher than expected between 1999 and 2002, the
reversal of the poor financial conditions seen from
2003 on is thought to represent the beginning of a
virtuous circle leading to a reduction in the public debt-
to-GDP ratio. Thus, the public debt ceases to be a
binding short-term target, since it is recognized that its
trend depends on exogenous factors.
In group B, there was a decline in the public debt
in Ecuador, Mexico and Panama, while in the other
countries the public debt-to-GDP ratio remained
relatively constant. In El Salvador, there was an intense
positive wealth adjustment due to the recent
dollarization process. In Ecuador it was necessary to
accumulate primary surpluses of almost 17 points of
GDP to achieve a reduction of 5 GDP points in the
country’s public debt over the period, which affects to
the strong negative impact of the snowball effect; as
in El Salvador, there was a wealth adjustment due to
the dollarization process. In the Dominican Republic,
the decline in the public debt as a proportion of GDP
was completely reversed by the financial crisis of 2003.
Thus, the consolidated public debt balance came to
40% of GDP in 2003, whereas in 2002 this indicator had
been only 24%. In the cases of Mexico and Panama,
the fiscal authorities managed to neutralize the negative
impact of the snowball effect by generating primary
surpluses. The total absence of a snowball effect is very
noteworthy in Chile, which is a country that has
maintained very low levels of public debt and interest
rates.
In group C, the snowball effect was much smaller,
except in the case of Costa Rica. In Bolivia, Guatemala,
Haiti and Honduras, the implicit interest rate was
relatively low. In these countries, much of the external
finance is concessional financing provided under the
support programmes of international lending agencies.
In Honduras, the external debt reduction initiative was
reflected in a strong wealth adjustment.
In countries that have increased their indebtedness,
events which have nothing to do with public debt
dynamics or stock/flow adjustments have been very
FIGURE 5
Latin America: Public debt dynamics,
1998-2002
A. Countries issuing sovereign bonds,
with increasing debt
C. Countries not included in the
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important, reflecting strong variations in relative prices
and the recognition of contingent debts14 of other levels
of government or of the financial system.15 These
factors, which illustrate the pressures placed on the
central government to assume debts of other economic
agents, endanger the sustainability of the public debt
from one day to another and result in bigger
adjustments than planned, with the consequent negative
effects for the economy as a whole. These anomalies
can only be combated by strengthening fiscal institutions
and those responsible for regulating the financial
systems.
IV
Factors underlying fiscal crises
As we can see, the primary balances needed to stabilize
the public debt are extremely volatile owing to sharp
variations in interest rates exchange rates, and
economic growth rates. Although the above analysis
shows the importance of exogenous factors, it does not
make it possible to identify the factors which set off
fiscal crises. This is what we will seek to investigate
below.
1. An indicator of currency mismatches
Currency mismatches correspond to a situation where
the currency composition of the assets of a country or
sector differs from that of its liabilities, so that the net
balance is sensitive to variations in exchange rates. In
Latin America, the public debt is generally expressed
in foreign currency, while government revenue
depends largely on domestic output. This situation
gives rise to a currency mismatch in the public-sector
balance, causing fiscal sustainability to be very
sensitive to exchange-rate movements.
In order to analyse fiscal sustainability, Calvo,
Izquierdo and Talvi (2002) propose an indicator which
incorporates the currency composition of the debt and












 The 2005 Brazilian Budget Guidelines Act, for example, provides
for the recognition of “skeletons” (debts of the housing finance
system, among others) amounting to close to 0.8 GDP points per
year up to 2007.
15
 For a recent estimate of the fiscal costs of the financial system
crises, see IMF (2003a).
where e is the real exchange rate (defined as the
relative price between tradable and non-tradable
goods); DNT is the debt in terms of non-tradable goods;
DT is the debt in terms of tradable goods, YNT is output
in terms of non-tradable goods; and YT is output in
terms of tradable goods (approximated by exports). The
measure of the currency mismatch between the public
debt and GDP is then calculated as (DNT / eDT) / (YNT /
eYT). This measure can take any value between 0 and
1. If that value is close to 0, the public debt is totally
external (or denominated in foreign currency) or the
tradable GDP is infinitesimal, so that devaluation leads
to a proportional deterioration in fiscal sustainability.
If the value is close to 1, there is a perfect match in
the currency composition of the public debt and the
product. In this case, devaluation has no effect on fis-
cal sustainability. Table 4 gives two calculations of
measures of the currency mismatch of the public debt
and GDP: in the first one, the external debt is defined
as the debt in terms of tradable goods, while in the
second the domestic debt denominated in foreign
currency is added.
This indicator may not seem appropriate in
dollarized countries such as Ecuador and El Salvador,
while does show a high degree of mismatch in Argen-
tina, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay and the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The majority of
these countries have relatively low degrees of trade
openness (measured as exports-to-GDP) compared with
their levels of external public indebtedness. Mexico and
Chile are in a better position.
The public-private composition of exports is also
important, although in recent years many countries
have been collecting taxes on the export of certain
primary commodities and royalties in the mining sec-
tor, which tends to reduce the public sector’s currency
mismatch. What would be the ideal value of this
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indicator? If it were equal to 1, countries could pay off
their external obligations in a single year if they
devoted the whole of their exports to that purpose. This
situation is not very plausible, however. Perhaps an
indicator close to 0.5 would show a reasonable balan-
ce between the country’s capacity to generate foreign
exchange and its public-sector indebtedness.
The public debt mismatch indicator becomes less
favourable if we also take into account the domestic
debt expressed in foreign currency.16 In Brazil, for
example, 30% of the total domestic debt is indexed to
the exchange rate. In Mexico, the domestic public debt
is expressed entirely in local currency. The traditional
indicators of sustainability thus do not serve to reflect
the crucial problem represented by currency
mismatches.
1. The probabilistic nature of fiscal sustainability
As noted earlier, the assessment of fiscal sustainability
is by its very nature probabilistic. A comparative view
permits this matter to be approached by estimating
fiscal policy reaction functions (IMF, 2003c) or
probabilistic models (Manasse, Roubini and
Schimmelpfenning, 2003). In the first case, the primary
fiscal balance depends on the level of public debt in
the preceding period and on other factors such as the
economic cycle, inflation and commodity prices. This
approach makes it possible to estimate a primary ba-
lance target for each country which depends on the
level of indebtedness but also on exogenous
conditioning factors.
Another way of assessing sustainability is by
estimating the probability of a fiscal crisis. According
to the methodology developed by Manasse, Roubini
and Schimmelpfenning (2003), it is assumed that a
country is in a fiscal crisis if it is classified as being in
default by Standard and Poor’s, or if it has received
the disbursement of over 100% of its quota during the
first year of an agreement with IMF.
In a sample of 12 Latin American countries, 25
debt crisis episodes were identified during 1970-2002
according to the above criterion. Table 5 shows the
averages for some of the variables used in the estimates
and the values of the associated parameters for the 12
countries in question over the period 1980-2002.
During the 1990s the average total public debt was
47.5 points of GDP when the countries were in crisis
and 30.8 points in “normal” circumstances (when the
variable is the external public debt, the respective
amounts are 42.1 and 25.4 for 1980-2002). These fi-
gures doubtless form the basis for the recommendation
to keep the public debt within the range of 25-30 points
of GDP. It is worth recalling that this reasoning only
holds true if future external conditions are expected to
be as unfavourable as those prevailing in the last two
decades.
TABLE 4
Latin American countries: Public debt mismatch
measurements, 2002
External debt/ Exports/GDP (%) Public debt Public debt
total public debt (%) mismatcha mismatchb
Argentina 62.8 27.7 0.23 0.12
Brazil 35.2 15.5 0.34 0.08
Chile 36.5 34.5 0.91 0.03
Colombia 50.3 17.5 0.21 0.20
Ecuador 77.7 25.4 0.10 …
El Salvador 66.9 26.7 0.18 …
Mexico 39.7 27.2 0.57 0.57
Peru 78.2 16.4 0.05 …
Uruguay 74.8 21.6 0.09 …
Venezuela (Bolivarian
Republic of) 67.1 29.0 0.20 …
Source: Prepared by the authors.
a This measure takes account only of the external public debt.
b This measure also includes the domestic debt expressed in foreign currency.
16
 In the case of Chile, this indicator is distorted. The main creditor
of the Treasury (as far as the domestic debt is concerned) is the
Central Bank of Chile, and this debt is expressed in dollars and is
of a long-term nature.
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Liquidity variables, such as the short-term
external public debt, the current account balance and
the net flow of foreign direct investment, measured as
a percentage of GDP, are significantly different when
countries are in a crisis situation. Thus, for example,
the financial account balance is equivalent to 3.7% of
GDP in normal periods and –1.8% of GDP in crisis
periods.
With regard to fiscal variables, it can be seen that
interest payments on the debt and the short-term debt
are higher in times of crisis. This result is probably
endogenous, because maturities tend to be shorter and
interest rates higher when payment difficulties are
expected. The primary balance is higher in times of
crisis, which reflects the (procyclical) adjustment effort
made by governments in Latin America.
Finally, table 5 shows the result of the regressions,
using a probabilistic model.17 The coefficients have the
expected signs and are significant. The calculations
show that the marginal effects of liquidity variables,
TABLE 5
Latin America: Results of estimates
Average values of variables Regression results
All No crisis Crisis Marginal effect Logit coefficient z value
Variables fiscales
'Deuda pública total/PIB (1990–2002) 38.7 30.8 47.5
Pago intereses deuda pública/PIB 2.9 2.1 3.5 0.060 0.33 2.01
Deuda corto plazo/PIB 9.1 7.6 10.2 0.012 0.07 1.82
Intereses de corto plazo/PIB 0.5 0.5 0.6
Balance primario/PIB  1.0 0.6 1.3
Variables externas
Deuda pública externa/PIB 35.1 25.4 42.1 0.009 0.09 2.03
Balance de cuenta corriente/PIB –2.4 –3.2 –1.8
Balancede cuenta financiera/PIB 0.9 3.7 –1.1 –0.029 –0.16 –2.71
Inversión extranjera directa (flujos netos)/PIB 1.9 2.6 1.3
Reservas/PIB 7.7 8.8 7.0 –0.023 –0.12 –2.64
Intereses sobre deuda externa/PIB 3.3 2.9 3.7
Intereses sobre deuda externa/Exportaciones 15.2 13.2 16.6
Otras variables
Apertura comercial/PIB 52.2 53.9 50.9 –0.003 –0.02 –2.98
Crecimiento real PIB (%) 2.4 2.8 2.1 –0.024 –0.13 –1.72
Inflación (%) 138.0 20.2 226.5
Constante –2.44 –2.6
Rezago del indicador de crisis 0.762 4.42 7.3
Source: Prepared by the authors.
such as the capital account balance, interest payments
on the debt, and international reserves as a proportion
of GDP, are greater than those connected with solvency
variables, such as the external debt-to-GDP ratio. The
degree of trade openness and the real growth rate are
also important: the first of these incorporates an
explanatory factor for currency mismatches, while the
second captures the importance of the snowball effect
in crisis periods. Finally, it may be noted that the
lagged explanatory variable is of great importance. This
points up the difficulty that countries have in
extricating themselves from debt crises, probably due
to “reputation” effects which prevent a rapid return to
normality.
17
 Using panel data for 12 Latin American countries which have
access to capital markets for the issue of sovereign debt instruments,
a binary choice (logit) model was estimated in order to identify the
variables and maximum levels that cause countries to enter into a
debt crisis.
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V
How can public debt sustainability
be ensured?
The results set forth in this article provide various clues
to possible policy options for ensuring medium-term
solvency. Naturally, countries must adopt laws or rules
that ensure large enough primary surpluses to keep the
public debt under control. A good deal of progress has
been made in this respect, with the adoption of
medium-term criteria that ensure control over public
spending.18 In this sense, the “reaction function” of the
countries of the region for coping with debt dynamics
have improved substantially in the last few years.
The need for a suitable safety margin indicates
that the fiscal authorities should set their indebtedness
indicators well below current levels. As the exogenous
component of the debt is very high, thus generating
snowball effects which threaten macroeconomic
stability, the alternative is to prolong the adjustment
processes indefinitely until a “safe” target can be
reached in which the public debt-to-GDP ratio is not
more than 30%. It is true that this alternative represents
the “long way round” for melting the snowball.
There are other possible roads, however, if
international financial institutions decide to take a hand
in the matter. In addition to initiatives aimed at
strengthening mechanisms for preventing and solving
crises,19 two recent proposals are particularly interesting.
As proposed by Eichengreen, Haussman and
Panizza (2002), one way of securing “redemption”
from original sin would be for international financial
institutions to issue debt in a new unit of account
comprising an index of a basket of developing-country
currencies. Those institutions would lend in the new
unit of account, or alternatively in the currency of each
country, in proportion to the new unit of account’s
share in the basket. The institutions would thus act as
intermediaries in the process of issuing sovereign
18
 For an analysis of the macro-fiscal rules in force in the region,
see Martner (2003) and ILPES (2004).
bonds in local currency. This would eliminate the
currency-mismatch effects generated by the loans,
which would thus become a solution instead of a
further source of imbalance.
The other proposal is designed to ensure the
sustainability of debt by reducing the snowball effect
in public finances. Thus, for example, Borensztein and
Mauro (2002) argue that most debt crises are produced
by a slackening of the economy’s growth rate.
Countries could protect themselves by issuing bonds
indexed to GDP growth. This mechanism would help to
reduce the procyclical bias of fiscal policy, since
interest payments would decline during periods of
recession and would increase in boom times, thus
ensuring a sustainable public debt trajectory.
In general terms, a process that combines the
systematic generation of primary surpluses, self-
insurance mechanisms —such as stabilization funds or
schemes for the prepayment of debt in periods of
economic buoyancy or when interest rates are low—
and improvement of financing terms seems to be the
only way to achieve greater public debt sustainability.
In view of the devastating effects of public debt
dynamics in a recessionary environment, it seems clear
that, in addition to domestic efforts to generate primary
surpluses on a regular basis, substantial contributions
are also needed from international financial institutions
in order to lower financial costs in middle-income
countries, relax conditionality when appropriate,
provide orderly procedures for restructuring the
external debt, and promote mechanisms to encourage
sovereign bonds issues indexed to a basket of
currencies and to the countries’ payment capacity.
(Original: Spanish)
19
 See, for example, the proposals contained in Martín and Ocampo
(2003).
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